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Abstract
During last decades there has been a worldwide trend towards revision of the traditional
model of public financing and operation at ports and airports. Among other changes,
private participation appears as a new alternative. Though there is not a unique model of
private participation, the implementation of concession contracts stands out. The
concession model seems to adequately provide governments with much needed funds for
infrastructure expansion. At the same time, it allows them to keep property and retain the
facilities at the end of the concession period. Furthermore, it provides a financial windfall
for governments with restricted budgets. At the moment such a model is being widely
applied to all types of transport infrastructures. For ports and airports important common
features can be found. This paper deals with such peculiarities and the influence they have
for the introduction of competition.
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Ports an airports share a series of elements and economics features. Both are non-
network transport infrastructures where a set of essential activities and a group of
complementary services can be separated. Such a distinction facilitates the introduction of
private participation, that at both, ports and airports gains a greater weight every day,
though still a relatively recent phenomenon. Arguments supporting privatization are also
common: exploiting the private initiative comparative advantage in term of efficiency and
limiting the burden of financing upon the public sector. In such a process the role of
concessions stands out. Concessions provide a new framework for participation of the
private sector, that builds, develops or rents the infrastructure and will operate it for a given
period of time, after which assets will return to public sector hands.
2. COMMON ECONOMIC FEATURES
Port and airport services demand is of derived nature. This means that services
offered are generally demanded as a consequence of the economic activity of the region
where they are located. Any variation in the rate of growth of the general economy usually
determine the level of activity at ports and airports, hence being affected  by economy
cycles. This derived demand feature appears for all modes of transport and for transport
infrastructures.
On the other hand, both ports and airports are non-network transport infrastructures
that are placed in a given region functioning as interchangers between modes of transports.
In the case of ports, between maritime and surface modes, and for airports, between air and
surface modes.
Ports and airports industries are complex and multi-product enterprises. They
produce services for vessels and aircraft, for ship-liners and airlines, for cargo and for
passengers, though production even differs inside a given type of service. For instance, the
productive process of containers unloading is very different from the unloading of bulk
commodities or general cargo in terms of technology or productivity. In the case of airports
it is very different to handle passengers instead of cargo.2
There are two other basic characteristics that featured the organisation of activities
at ports and airports. The infrastructures where the activities are developed (berths, docks,
runways, terminals, storing surfaces, etc) have quite a high construction costs and are long
lasting elements, what implies the need of a rigorous investment planning for this type of
transport infrastructures. In addition there is the problem of indivisibilities, this is, berths
and runways size, for instance, can not be continuously increased, instead, the construction
ought to be made with a given dimension and for a certain production volume.
In order to analyse the operation of ports and airports it is advisable to distinguish
among the provision of infrastructure, the services and activities that are carried out at
them, and the organisation and coordination work that it is usually done by an authority of
public nature. Hence, besides provision of infrastructure, there are also a great variety of
services that are offered by a group of agents that act inside and outside ports and airports
areas. Those services refer to the whole set of activities related to the connection of the user
with the port or airport, starting with the approaching of vessels or aircraft to land till they
finalise its relationship with the port or airport, and going, in the interim, through the
services provided to vessels, planes, passengers, crews and commodities (De Rus et al,
1994 and 1996).
The diversity of activities developed inside ports and airports areas make necessary the
existence of an agent that would coordinate services. In most countries such a task is
carried out by an institution known as port or airport authority. In general the authorities are
of public nature (either local, regional or central government), though it is also possible to
find instances of authorities of pure private nature. This public feature does not necessarily
implies that services would be operated by the public sector. Worldwide two types of
organisational models according to the degree of intervention of the authority can be
distinguished:
• The infrastructure is owned by the authority (public or private) that manages it, whilst
services are operated by private firms that in addition are also the owners of assets
constituting the superstructure (buildings,..) and any other assets needed for the
production of services (cranes, transport elements,...). Examples of this type of3
organisation for ports are Buenos Aires (Argentine) and Rotterdam (The Netherlands),
and in general is the most frequent type of organisation for bigger ports. There are other
cases in which the authority also owns and manages the superstructure and equipment,
though as in the previous case, the private sector provides services by using assets
under a concession or franchise agreement. Instances of this category for ports are
Antwerp (Belgium) and Seattle (United States). In airports the distinction between
infrastructure and superstructure does not make as much sense as in ports, and hence
therefore this type of organisation at airports corresponds with a situation in which the
authority owns and manages the infrastructure, whilst private operators may provide
under a concession or rent agreement, almost any airport service For airports, one
example of this type of organisational model is given by airports at United States where
a great deal of activities are contracted out to the private sector. However most airports
around the world might be fitted inside this model, though the degree of private
participation varies from one country to another.
• The authority (public or private) is the owner of the infrastructure and responsible for
operating all services. Traditionally the port of Singapore have been considered as a
clear instance of such a type of organisation (nevertheless the introduction of private
participation is foreseen). In this case the authority carries out the handling of cargo,
owns the harbour installations and other assets as gantry cranes.  In airports this model
would corresponds with a case in which the authority carries out all the activities, even
offering commercial services itself and not resorting to concession instruments.
However, such a type of organisation is very unlikely at airports, actually, even at
airports with a high degree of public intervention, it is usual that commercial services
would be provided by private firms under a concession contract.
1
At first, the main duty of ports and airports authorities would be to provide
infrastructure and coordinate services, however, in many countries where the figure of an
industry regulator does not exist, such institution usually assume other task as investments
planning and financing and design and implementation of the pricing regulatory
framework.
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3. TRADITIONAL VIEW OF THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
Traditionally, ports and airports have been considered as strategic infrastructures
from both, the military and the commercial point of view. Such a feature was used to
support their public sector property that was also supposed to finance all investments. Both
were considered public utilities. In welfare terms, the benefits to society stemming from the
operation of these services would always compensate for eventual financial losses, and
would thus justify corresponding subsidies. In addition, there was the belief that it was
more adequate to provide services in an integrated manner, being a public and integrated
monopoly the best organisational model. Individual government regulation is almost absent
in this context. Being public monopolies already means interference, making it unnecessary
to have economic regulation aimed at greater efficiency.
As a consequence of this type of economic structure, main problem arising at ports
and airports were common to other publicly managed industries. Most typical problems
associated with this type of organisation are similar around the world: high fares, long
waiting times, excessive labour, strong equipment investment needs  and, in many times
however, excess of capacity. This situation worsens when is accompanied by public sector
financial difficulties, that can not cope with needed investments in order to convert port and
airports sectors into competitive business.
In summary, port and airport infrastructures have been traditionally built,
maintained and directly operated by the public sector. Nevertheless, when governments
start worrying about the burden of airport financing and the lack of efficiency, the
traditional model appears to be unsustainable. Nowadays there is an strong trend towards
revision of this type of organisational model.
4. THE ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE REFORM
From an economic point of view, ports and airports are organisations that do not
necessarily have to be operated by the public sector, on the contrary, they could be
managed according to market forces by the private sector. Thompson and Budin (1997),5
identify several reasons that in general have promoted private participation through
concessions in the transport sector. First of all, private operators are able to provide services
at a lower cost for the economy than the public sector due to efficiency gains. Second, if
private participation is allowed, the public sector could apply scarce resources to other
more priority areas. Finally, the private sector usually is more competent for discovering
new business opportunities  and more flexible to operate at competitive markets.
From a more general approach, there are several other reasons that give rise to
reforms, standing out the fiscal crisis at many developing economies that are unable to face
ports and airports investment needs. Therefore, restricting the role of the public sector
seems necessary. Besides, developments at air and maritime transport have propitiated
demand increases in port and airport services, and at the same time, transformations of the
demand structure, motivated by increases in aircraft and vessels size, have been occurring.
On one side, these influence investment, as there appears the need of infrastructure
adjustment to the new trends; but, on the other side, they also affect service productivity
that would have to be increased if more competitive ports and airports are aimed.
However, the application of the privatization concept in ports and airports may be
misleading. First of all, what is a privatized port or airport? If one understand by that a port
or airport in which the private sector starts operations after a period of public
administration, then the range of possibilities for private sector involvement is really wide.
At least as wide as the set of activities that take place inside them. Besides, if we
distinguish between assets property and management the playing field is still wider.
Therefore a privatized port or airport is not necessarily one in which the property and
operations are in public hands, actually this is one of the possible options, though only one
among many others.6
5. DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES
The categorisation of ports and airports activities is a key starting point for the
application of the privatization concept. Tables 1 and 3 provide a description of main
activities carried out at them.
Description of port activities
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First, the provision of infrastructure services have been traditionally operated by
port authorities. There are two types of customer requiring infrastructure services: vessels
that utilize berths and all the necessary infrastructure to get into the port and that pay for it
corresponding fares to the authority, and port operators that also make use of port
infrastructure and pay a canon to the authority.
There is also a group of services related to berthing, which include pilotage, towing
and tying. All these services can be directly provided by port authorities, or they can be
offered by private firms. Pilotage is defined as those operations required for a ship to enter
and exit a port safely, and it usually implies the presence in the vessel’s bridge (or at least a
contact by radio) of an expert with sufficient knowledge of the zone to avoid risks. Pilots
can be independent private agents in some ports, licensed by the port authority, while in
other cases they are public employees. Towage is the operation of moving a ship using
small powerful boats (named tugs) to steer it more easily. Again, it is possible to have
private firms providing services for these operations, while in other ports tugs and their
operators are directly hired by the port authority.
One of the more important services provided to cargo ships is what is generically
labeled as cargo handling. This encompasses all activities related to the movement of cargo
from/to ships and across port facilities. There is a historic separation between the operations
of moving goods from ship’s side until they are safely stored within the vessel
(stevedoring), and those movements from berth to ship’s side (loading), as a result of these
operations traditionally being performed by different workers. Today, however, there are
specialized firms that provide all these cargo handling services, using equipment such as
cranes and surface transport elements.7
The process of cargo handling varies according to the type of goods involved. There
is a trend toward the specialization of firms according to the type of cargo, since the
equipment required can then be specially designed to be highly cost-efficient. Thus,
specialization leads to the formation of terminals, defined as specialized berths where all
operations are mainly concentrated on a given type of cargo. Container terminals constitute
the best example of this trend, since the handling of containers requires large gantry cranes,
and land storage is relatively easy with adequate trucks and lifts, but it is highly space-
consuming. All these factors make it more convenient for a firm to have a specially
designed berth in order to handle containers more efficiently than general cargo berths.
Of the total cost involved in moving goods through a seaport, cargo handling
charges are the most important (between 70% and 90% of total cost, approximately,
depending on the type of goods). Therefore, this is one of the services that must be
supervised more closely by a regulator in order to ensure cost-efficient port operations.
Another type of service demanded by port users are those related to administrative
paperwork and permits (sanitary certificates, import/export documents, taxes, etc). These
are usually performed by specialized agents or consignees, who are hired by shipping
companies to arrange in advance the paperwork and all matters related to the use of port
facilities by a ship. Even before a ship calls at a port, consignees start working to arrange
that all services required (handling, repairs, supplies, etc) are contracted for the ship and
performed in the shortest feasible period.
It is essential for a modern port to have systems to minimize the burden of
paperwork for port users, since delays originating in inefficiency in administrative
procedures result in large economic losses to shippers, who do not receive their goods on
expected dates and thus have to alter their productive plans, and to shipping companies,
which have to keep their ships in ports for longer than necessary. In the European Union,
there are some guidelines established to promote ports’ investments in developing
electronic data interchange systems (EDI). These systems are aimed at speeding up
administrative paperwork and reducing waiting times for ships and land transport modes
(trucks, railways) that deliver goods to/from ports (European Commission, 1997).8
Finally, there is a series of other ancillary services performed by different agents
and firms, working within or even outside the port area. In this group, all supplies to ships
must be included, of which fuel and water are probably the most important. There are also
services to crew members (medical, etc), and general common services such as cleaning,
refuse collection, safety and the like. Some ports can also offer repair facilities to ships,
which may involve the use of some special infrastructures.
In summary, there are many different services offered by a port. These services can
be performed by a combination of public and private initiatives, and there are several
models of ports indicating how private participation is introduced. From the regulatory
point of view, the provision of infrastructure and cargo handling are the more relevant
services, since  efficiency in seaports is dependent on these two services. Other services can
be provided by private firms working in more or less competitive conditions. The need for
regulation is, therefore, not so strong for them.


































Historically,  the private initiative have been present at ports by carrying services
through licences, concessions or permits. However, the lack of competition led to private
monopoly situations guaranteed by permits to operate services for a long period of time.
Table 2 shows possibilities for the introduction of competition in port activities. There may
be till three competition fields. First of all if there is competition among ports, services
would try to be as much competitive as possible in order to get traffic. When this option is
not feasible, port size determines the level of competition inside each type of service. For9
example, there may be several terminals competing among them inside the same port.
When the port small size does not allow such alternative it is the moment to introduce
competition for the right to serve the market. Table 2 shows that, in the case of
infrastructure provision, competition among ports is the only chance to include competition
in the market given the natural monopoly feature that appears for this type of infrastructure.
Table 2. Scope of Competition in Port Services




Usually operated by the port authority
Unlikely





Depends on market size
Competition for the market for small ports





• Freezing (fish, others)
Depends on type of service
• Stevedoring:
Competition in the market is feasible
• Terminals:
Competition among ports
Competition among terminal inside the
same port




• Administrative paperwork for ships and
cargo






• Cleaning, refuse collection
• Safety and security
Yes10
Description of airport services
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The activities carried out at airports may be classified into three distinct groups:
essential operational services and facilities, handling services, and commercial activities
(Doganis, 1992). The first two are commonly referred to as aeronautical services, while the
latter are considered non-aeronautical.
Essential operational services include the air traffic control system, meteorological
services, telecommunications, police and security, fire, ambulance and first aid services,
and runways, aprons, taxiways, grounds and building maintenance. These activities
determine the safety of airport operations, and hence, are considered essential to the airport
business. Handling services refer to a great variety of activities. We can distinguish
between those that are directly related to the aircraft (ground and ramp handling), such as
cleaning, providing power and fuel, and loading and unloading luggage and freight; and
those that are traffic related (traffic handling), such as processing passengers, baggage and
freight through the terminal building. Finally, commercial services involve a large variety
of different activities that may either be located at the terminal building or around the
airport. Duty free shops and other retail shopping, restaurants and bars, leisure services,
hotel accommodations, banks, car rental and parking services, and conference and
communication facilities are examples of the myriad of activities that are included in the
non-aeronautical set of airport operations.
Nevertheless, the classifications in Table 3 are not applicable to all airport activities.
Sometimes the criteria that allow one type of service to be separated from another become
blurred. Aeronautical or airside activities focus on the operation of aircraft and the
movement of passengers and freight; while the non-aeronautical or landside activities are
connected to commercial operations that occur in the terminal and on airport land, usually
under a concession contract. Any concession that relates to aircraft or traffic handling
would share some features with both aeronautical and non-aeronautical services. Fuel
concessions and passenger and freight handling, when provided by an airport agent, are
examples of activities that would not fit into the above table. Therefore, the classifications
shown in Table 3 should be regarded as tentative.11
Table 3. Classification of Airport Activities




1. Air traffic control
2. Meteorological services
3. Telecommunication
4. Police and security
5. Fire, ambulance and first
aid services
6. Runway, apron and
taxiway maintenance
1. Aircraft cleaning
2. Provision of power and
fuel
3. Luggage and freight
loading and unloading
4. Processing of passengers,
baggage and freight
5. Catering
1. Duty free shops
2. Other retailing shopping




7. Car rental and parking
8. Conference and
communication facilities
It has been common to have commercial activities being operated by private firms
under a concession or rent contract. However the introduction of the private sector inside
aeronautical activities is more a novelty. For handling services private participation is better
known, though relatively recent  for traffic handling. Regarding operational services we
find that empirical evidence of private participation is really rare, though it deserves to be
considered.
Operational services have been considered as the airport “core”. They are essential
activities with important implications on safety. Bearing this in mind, can the private
initiative successfully operate them?. Would not be the case that the searching of profits
would deteriorate safety standards?. The air traffic control (ATC) has usually been left out
of privatization schemes and remained under government control. Nevertheless, this trend
is changing. For instance, the ATC in New Zealand has been corporatized and is operated
by a limited liability company with two shareholders, the Ministry of Finance and the
Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises. The Canadian government went even further in 1996,
selling its ATC to a private operator, Nav Canada, which is subject to an economic
regulatory regime. At the moment the British Government is also considering the
privatization of this service. Most ATC systems, however, have not been privatized
because of the fear that commercial pressures could compromise safety standards. This fear
was also expressed by opponents of airline deregulation. In this situation, there are two
possible views (Chalk, 1993), the market-failure view and the market-response view.12
According to the former, privatized airlines or ATC private operators face negative
financial and safety incentives, suggesting that they could be inclined to reduce their safety
expenses in order to increase profits. The second view suggests that since reduced safety
can be observed in the form of accidents, consumers will use this as an indicator of an
operator’s level of safety, therefore penalizing negligent firms, possibly forcing them to
leave the industry. For the airline industry, there is enough evidence to support both views
(Rose, 1990 and Borenstein and Zimmerman, 1988). The actual industry safety levels are
influenced by both the market-failure and market-response views, indicating that safety
regulation is necessary, although in practice, it has been imperfect and complemented by
market mechanisms. That experience should be taken into account when introducing
private participation in ATC systems. The case of El Dorado airport in Bogota (Colombia),
in which a concession was applied for the construction and operation of a second runway
illustrates the possibility for introduction of the private sector in the construction,
maintenance and operation of runway systems.
In the strict sense, one airport would not be subject to competition until another
nearby airport begins to compete for traffic.
5 However, if one considers that the services
carried out at airports are quite numerous and differ in nature, perhaps there is some other
scope for the introduction of competitive forces. This is competition for the right to serve
the market.
As shown in Table 4, most airport activities, with the exception of operational
services, may be subject to competitive forces, at least in the form of competition for the
market. Hence, if subcontracting takes place, any concern regarding the exploitation of
monopoly power should mainly regard operational activities. This is the reason why most
regulatory provisions affecting airport charges concentrate on the operational side of
activities. In fact, most cases of airport pricing regulation, either discretionary or contract
regulation, principally aim to control operational charges.
Looking more closely at handling and commercial activities, the question arises
whether the introduction of competition for the market will be sufficient to reduce
monopoly power, or should some regulatory mechanism be in place? Let us assume that an
airport authority concerned with maximizing profit decides to concession a given facility or13
service.
6 It may award the concession to one or to several competitive operators. For
instance, it may allow only one handling agent to operate the whole airport, in which case
the monopoly reproduces itself; or it may allow several competing agents to serve the
airport. Alternatively, it may allow only one or several restaurant operators to cater the
whole airport. In this way, a regulator also needs to worry about these aspects of airport
operations, even if they represent only a small part of airport revenues.
Table 4. Scope of Competition in Airport Services
Competition for the market
Feasible Desirable
Operational
Air traffic control* YES ?
Meteorological services ? ?
Telecommunication YES ?
Police and security YES ?
Fire, ambulance and first aid YES ?
Runway, apron and taxiway maintenance YES YES
Handling
Aircraft cleaning YES YES
Provision of power and fuel YES YES
Luggage and freight loading and unloading YES YES
Processing of passengers, baggage and freight YES YES
Commercial
Duty free shops YES YES
Other retailing shopping YES YES
Restaurants and bars YES YES
Leisure services YES YES
Hotel accommodation YES YES
Banks YES YES
Car rental and parking YES YES
Conference and communication facilities YES YES
*:The ATC may be subject to other forms of private participation.14
6. THE NEW TRENDS
The introduction of private sector participation appears as the most appealing
alternative in order to solve port and airport problems and to develop successfully their
activity in a competitive environment. Jointly with developing economies financial needs,
the change in orientation of the European Union policy, in terms of elimination of subsidies
in both sectors, have given rise to a worldwide trend. Such a trend emphasises that ports
and airports are organisations for which public authorities can retain property avoiding the
risk of monopolisation of essential assets by private firms, though it might hand it over to
the private sector that would carry out operations, investments, improvements and
maintenance.
The traditional model is gradually transformed into an organisation in which the
public sector keeps carrying organisational and coordination works, whilst private operators
are responsible for provision of services and, in many cases, for infrastructure and
equipment investments. More specifically, it may be noticed a higher participation of
private funds in construction and operation of infrastructure elements through concession
contracts (see Table 5). Public financing is considered as a non-realistic option.
With implementation of concession contracts private operators are motivated to
invest in construction and maintenance, however, and in order to avoid the exertion of anti-
competitive practices, there is also the need to regulate the utilisation of port and airport
assets. Obviously, private initiative participation in the development of new infrastructure,
and in many cases the subsequent operation, is quite different from the simple operation of
activities described at Tables 1 and 3. However, both alternatives share the need of
regulation. In this sense, the government has to assume a new role, it must become an
efficient regulator and leave behind its past as an inefficient operator. Correct design of
concession contracts appears as a key element for ports and airports at present.
Table 5 shows number of projects with private participation at port and airports
during the last fifteen years. It is at Latin American countries where most projects are
related to ports  mainly due to infrastructure deterioration. In the rest of the world  airport15
projects are more numerous as a result of the spectacular increase in air transport and the
taking off of the tourism industry.











   Total Planned 33 12238 5 1624
   Construction
started as of 10/99 10 4112 1 309
Latin America
   Total Planned 30 5949 46 5183
   Construction
started as of 10/99 2 347 11 774
Europe
   Total Planned 26 13165 12 1119
   Construction
started as of 10/99 6 3820 4 94
Asia
   Total Planned 59 69996 46 19245
   Construction
started as of 10/99 17 29261 11 3306
Total
   Total Planned 165 103648 119 31895
   Construction
started as of 10/99 38 37798 27 4483
Source: Public Works Financing (1999)
7. INSTRUMENTS FOR THE REFORM
In general main instrument for reforming port and airport are presented at Table 6.
First of all, it shows that in order to clarify the new role of private operators in traditionally
public sectors, a reform of the legal framework is necessary. The establishment of an
adequate framework is essential to favour the introduction of private money in a transparent
fiscal and legal environment.
Centralisation in public hands of business units is another feature of traditional
organisation systems. Decentralisation aims autonomous and self-financing units, in a way
that the new governmental role would be to supervise and regulate.16
For the introduction of private participation to be effective it is important to
disintegrate activities. At a first stage one should distinguish between infrastructure
provision and services that are carried out at them. Secondly, it is important to select the
type of activities where the introduction of competition is feasible and those with public
utility aspects. Once such a clarifications have been made, what would be dependent on the
market size, the process of introducing competition is ready to start. If competition among
ports or airports is not feasible it is essential to analyse if competition in the market for
some service can take place, for instance several container terminals competing in the same
ports or several handling operators competing at the same airport. If the market dimension
does not allow it, hence competition for the market through a public bidding process is the
last choice.
Finally, the set of contract available for regulating the relationship between the
public and the private sector is numerous. From the simple licence or permit to operate a
service till more complex contract the require infrastructure investments. Concessions are
perhaps the most well known contracts, and include a  wide range of possibilities (BOT,
BOO, BOOT, etc.), though the key important element is that at the end of the concession
period facilities return to public sector hands.
Table 6. Instruments for Ports and Airports Reforms
• Legal framework reform
• Decentralisation of business units
• Sector disintegration. Vertical and/or horizontal
- Services versus infrastructure
- Competitive versus monopolistic
• Introduction of competition
- In the market versus for the market versus among markets
- Deregulation versus re-regulation
• Introduction of private participation
- Licences, permits, concessions...for services
- BOTs, BOOs... for new projects17
8. CONCLUSIONS
Ports and airports share important common features. They are both non-network
transport infrastructure and complex and multi-product enterprises where a set of essential
activities and a group of complementary services may be separated. Private participation in
both types of transport infrastructure have been present during the past, though the view of
ports and airport as strategic infrastructures limited its expansion and the chance to take
advantage of its ability to obtain efficiency gains. It is only at present when such a
participation have been considered as a way of getting away of public sector financing
problems and lack of efficiency.
Classification of activities is a useful tool in order to understand the potential of
private participation and the scope for the introduction of competitive forces as well. In the
strict sense there would be competition only if two ports or airports compete to get traffic.
However disintegration of activities opens up new alternatives for the private sector.
Among these concessions stand out. Nowadays, the private sector not only participate at
ports and airports by carrying out some services inside them. The private sector may also
build, improve and expand the infrastructure. In a context where public investments
transport infrastructures are limited or out of consideration , the alternative of concessions
contracts in which the public sector retain assets property is good news. However, if public
monopolies are being turned into private monopolies and if consumers interest are to be
protected, the government must assume a new role, the role of an efficient regulator.
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